Related Papers
Contagion effect due to Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and the global financial crisis - From the perspective of the Credit Default Swaps’ G14 dealers
2013 •
IRFAN AKBAR KAZI
This article investigates the dynamics of conditional correlation among the G14 banks’ dealer for the credit default swap market from January 2004 until May 2009. By using the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model developed by Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2006), we examine if there is contagion during the global financial crisis, following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy of September 15th, 2008. The main contribution of this article is to analyze if the interdependence structure between the G14 banks changed significantly during the crisis period. We try to identify the banks which were the most or the least affected by losses induced by the crisis and we draw some conclusions in terms of their vulnerability to financial shocks. We find that all banks became highly interdependent during Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy (short term impact), but only some banks faced high contagion during the global financial crisis (long term impact). Regulators who try to reinforce banks’ stabil...
Journal of Management Sciences
The Impact of Structural Empowerment on Organizational Citizenship Behavior-Organization and Job Performance: A Mediating Role of Burnout
2015 •
Hina Jaffery
Management Challenges in the post Covid-19 Era
Ethics Erosion in Capital Market: Lehman Brothers’ Case Study of Repo 105
2021 •
pankaj baag
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
Are Investment Banks Special Too? Evidence on Relationship-Specific Capital in Investment Bank Services
2012 •
William Megginson
Bank Corporate Governance: Failures and Reforms
Bank Corporate Governance: Failures and Reforms
2019 •
Lee Mutunga
Bank corporate governance has become a heated topic of discussion since the great depression of 1929 because of the unique nature of banking business. After the recent Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC), evidence of the systematic effects of bank practices has been widespread in the global economy. Traditionally, banks have had a bad reputation of handling investor and depositor funds and it was an eventuality that they would become a scapegoat to the crisis. Questions on bank governance resonated throughout economies around the world and people through their legislative representatives sought to revisit bank governance and regulation as this was a sequel to the great depression of 1929. This thesis provides some answers on the current state of bank corporate governance by primarily focusing on the fundamental contribution of corporate governance in the financial crisis. It identifies key failures and proves that failure in bank corporate governance played a significant contributory role in the financial crisis. It also shows that systematic risk and the interconnection of the global financial market amplified this failure by highlighting its complex and problematic nature. This Thesis bases its argument on existing empirical evidence and analyses them across the background of corporate governance mechanisms and legislations governing banks in the EU and the US. This thesis finds that weak corporate governance structures contributed to the failure of major banks and the subsequent collapse of economies around the world. It identifies systematic risk, risk management, executive compensation the agency problem and cumulation of these issues that is the moral hazard problem as the key failures in bank corporate governance. It concludes that there is room for improvement in terms of reform and regulators, should avoid reactionary legislative measures and adopt a progressive means of addressing bank corporate governance issues such as systematic risk and the moral hazard problem rather than using reactionary legislation. This thesis reasons that banking practices are unique and issues with their governance structure should be addressed from a different perspective.
The recent financial crisis : Lessons from Europe
2011 •
Harald Benink
Th e global fi nancial crisis of 2008 was triggered by the subprime loan crisis in the US which resulted in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy fi ling and bail-out of several major fi nancial institutions. Market integration meant that this crisis quickly spread to the rest of the world. Th e crisis negatively impacted both the fi nancial and real sector of Asian countries. To dampen the eff ect of this imported crisis, authorities in this region reacted swiftly through accommodating monetary policy and signifi cant fi scal spending. Other macro-prudential measures were also adopted. Prior to the crisis, both the fi nancial and real sectors in Asian countries were robust and together with the swift government response, the economy of the Asian countries recovered within four quarters. However, the accommodating policies also resulted in imported infl ation as a result of strong capital infl ow (both FDIs and Hot Money). Several countries experienced extremely strong housing price apprec...
Cass-Capco Institute Paper Series on Risk
A Financial Stress Index for the Analysis of XBRL Data
Mohamed Limam, Amira Dridi
In this paper we present a novel nonparametric approach to measure financial stress index to analyze financial data arising from balance sheets. We compare the results achieved with our approach with classical methods based on variance equal weight in a cross validation exercise via Monte Carlo simulation. Empirical investigations achieved on a real dataset show that our proposed approach provides a better performance in terms of error rate.
Learning from Past Mistakes: The Key to Latin America’s Financial Systems Resilience to the Global Financial Crisis. In World in Crisis: Insights from six Shadow Financial Regulatory Committees from Around the World
Liliana Rojas-suarez
This paper argues that there were two key factors behind the resilience of Latin American financial systems during the crisis. The first was the initial conditions that a number of countries in the region faced during the pre-crisis years. Sound macroeconomic policies and highly improved financial regulations were in place at the time the crisis erupted. This meant that banks and other financial institutions stood on a good footing when the external shock hit. The second factor (highly related to the first one) was the appropriate response of policymakers in several countries in the region to deal with the impact of the shock. In particular, and departing from previous crisis episodes, a set of Latin American countries were in a strong position to implement counter-cyclical monetary (and some even fiscal) policies that minimized the contraction of credit growth to the private sector and contributed to a rapid economic recovery. A third factor, not discussed in this paper, but well d...
The Lehman Brothers Final
Nabu Xavier
Research in the Sociology of Organizations
The Structure of Confidence and the Collapse of Lehman Brothers
Richard Swedberg
